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Abstract In the television show Deal or No Deal, a contestant is endowed with a
sealed box containing a monetary prize between one cent and half a million euros. In
the course of the show, the contestant is offered to exchange her box for another sealed
box with the same distribution of possible monetary prizes inside. This offers a unique
natural experiment for studying endowment effects under high monetary incentives.
We find evidence of only a weak endowment effect when contestants exchange their
box for another box with the same distribution of possible prizes.
Keywords Endowment effect · Expected utility theory · Prospect theory ·
Television show
1 Introduction
Substantial experimental evidence from economics and psychology suggests that ini-
tial endowments have an impact on human preferences. Endowment effect (Thaler
1980) says that when people come to own a good, they tend to value it more than
they did before they owned it (Kahneman et al. 1991). For example, Kahneman et al.
(1990) find that students, who were given mugs worth $6 each, were willing to sell
them at a median price of $7 each. At the same time, students, who did not come to
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possess the mugs, were willing to buy them at a median price of $3.50 per mug. While
many experiments replicate this result, several studies treat the endowment effect as an
inexperienced consumer’s mistake, which disappears in the process of learning (e.g.,
Knez et al. 1985; Coursey et al. 1987; Brookshire and Coursey 1987; Shogren 1994).
In a field experiment, List (2004) finds that professional dealers on the sports card
market are more likely to accept the swap offer than inexperienced consumers. List
(2004) argues that consumers facing decision problem which they have experienced
before may overcome the endowment effect. In a similar vein, Myagkov and Plott
(1997) find that risk-seeking behavior over losses predicted by prospect theory tends
to decrease with experience in a market setting. Plott and Zeiler (2007) show that
asymmetries in exchange behavior disappear if an experimenter controls for subject
misconceptions by introducing incentive-compatible elicitation device, subject train-
ing in the task, paid practice rounds, and subject anonymity. This article contributes
to this literature by showing that individuals exhibit only weak endowment effects if
they make decisions involving high stakes (even without prior practice or training and
when their decisions are broadcasted on television).
We use a natural experiment of the television show Deal or No Deal to analyze
endowment effects when stakes are large. Deal or No Deal is produced by the media
company Endemol in 44 countries worldwide. In this article, we analyze French,
Italian, and British versions of the show. Deal or No Deal contestants are endowed
with a sealed box, containing an unknown monetary prize. The maximum prize is
e500,000 in France and Italy and £250,000 in the UK.
During the show, contestants have a possibility to exchange their box for another
box with the same distribution of possible prizes inside.1 This provides a unique natural
experiment to test endowment effects in a previously unexplored domain—when lot-
teries involve large outcomes. The importance of large stakes is apparent in Blavatskyy
and Pogrebna (2008) who find that in contrast to numerous laboratory studies with low
monetary incentives, British and Italian Deal or No Deal contestants do not exhibit
lower risk aversion when facing gains of low probability.
We find that in all the three versions of the show, Deal or No Deal contestants
exhibit only weak endowment effects. The swap offer is accepted by 73%, 47%, and
43% of the contestants who receive exchange offers in the French, Italian, and British
version of the show, respectively. This finding suggests that people may overcome
endowment effects under high monetary incentives.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes television
show Deal or No Deal. Data are presented in Sect. 3. Section 4 derives the theoretical
predictions of expected utility, regret, and prospect theory. Section 5 presents our main
empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 Description of the television show
French, Italian, and British versions of the Deal or No Deal television show have
the following common features. Several contestants, each representing one of the
1 In addition to exchange offers, contestants also receive monetary offers for selling the content of their box.
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administrative regions of the country, participate in every television episode. All the
contestants self-select into the show by submitting an application for participation
either through the national Deal or No Deal web site or by calling the selection center
in their country.
Contestants are randomly assigned identical sealed boxes, numbered consecutively
from the first to the last. Boxes contain monetary prizes, ranging from very small
to very large. Monetary prizes are allocated across boxes by the independent notary
company. Contestants know the list of possible prizes at any point of the show, but
they do not know the content of each box.
The show consists of two stages. During the first (preliminary) stage, one contestant
is selected to play the game. Remaining contestants (waiting contestants) continue to
participate in the next television episode. The contestant, selected to play the game, is
replaced by a new representative of the same region. New contestant is selected from
a pool of volunteers who applied for the participation.
The second stage is the game itself. During the game, a contestant keeps her own
box and opens the remaining boxes one by one. When a box is opened, the prize hidden
inside is publicly revealed and eliminated from the list of possible prizes.
After opening several boxes, a contestant receives an offer from the “bank.” The
offer could be either a monetary price for the content of her box or the possibility to
exchange her box for any of the remaining sealed boxes. If a contestant is offered to
swap her box, she can pick any box from the sealed boxes that are left in the game
(the new box is not selected by the producers, the audience, or other contestants). In
this article, we analyze contestants’ decisions whether to accept or reject the exchange
offer.
The game terminates when either the contestant accepts the price offered by the
“bank” or when all boxes are opened. In the latter case, the contestant leaves with the
content of her box, which is opened last. The game does not terminate when the con-
testant accepts (or rejects) the exchange offer. Irrespective of the contestant’s decision
on the exchange offer, she must continue opening the remaining sealed boxes one by
one until the “bank” makes another offer or all the boxes are opened.
2.1 French version
À Prendre ou à Laisser is the French version of Deal or No Deal. It is aired every
weeknight on the channel TF1 of the French television. The show features 22 contes-
tants from 22 different regions of France, holding identical boxes. Each box contains
a randomly assigned monetary prize, ranging betweene0.01 ande500,000.2 The list
of possible prizes is given on Fig. 1. For entertainment purposes, three low monetary
prizes are substituted by token gifts (e.g., a cup for e5 or a puppy for e100). Boxes
are assigned to the contestants by an independent adjudicator who is present in the
studio during the show.
During the preliminary stage, contestants receive one general knowledge selection
question with three possible answers (A, B, and C). One contestant out of those, who
2 In 2007, the number of contestants was increased to 24, and the top prize was raised to e1,000,000.
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Fig. 1 Screenshot with a list of possible prizes in the French version of Deal or No Deal
have answered this question correctly, is selected to play the game. However, the crite-
ria for the selection procedure (e.g., “fastest finger,” random selection, longest waiting
time on the show) are not revealed to the public.
In the French version of Deal or No Deal, one of the prizes is a “Joker”—an
episode-specific variable. The “Joker” is determined in the beginning of the show
by multiplying the number of correct answers with the selection question, given by
the contestants in the preliminary stage, by e10,000. The amount of the “Joker” is
instantaneously added to the list of possible prizes.3
In the French version of the show, contestants receive offers from the “bank” after
opening 6, 3, 3, 3, 3, and 2 boxes, respectively. Another peculiarity of this version
is that exchange offers are fairly frequent (up to four exchange offers per episode).
However, there is no requirement for the “bank” to make any exchange offers to the
contestant during a television episode.
2.2 Italian version
Affari Tuoi is a daily television show, broadcasted on the first channel of Italian tele-
vision RAI Uno. Twenty contestants participate in every episode. Every contestant is
randomly assigned one box that contains 1 of 20 monetary prizes ranging between
e0.01 and e500,000 (Fig. 2). Four low prizes are substituted with the token gifts.
Similarly to the French version, independent notary company assigns boxes to con-
testants. Before February 11, 2006, contestants have received offers from the “bank”
after opening 6, 3, 3, 3, and 3 boxes, respectively. Starting from February 11, 2006, the
“bank” makes offers after a contestant opens 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, and 1 box, respectively.
In every episode, the contestant receives at least one offer to exchange her box. Offi-
cial rules of the show require the “bank” to offer exchange option at least once in every
television episode. Therefore, the first offer that the “bank” makes to the contestant
3 In our example, 22 contestants have answered the selection question correctly. Therefore, the amount of
the “Joker” displayed on Fig. 1 is e220,000.
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Fig. 2 Screenshot with a list of possible prizes in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal
is always the exchange offer.4 Since the “bank” always proposes exchange in the first
offer, irrespective of the distribution of the remaining prizes or the personality of the
contestant, the first exchange offer is always uninformative, i.e., it does not provide
any information about possible content of the contestant’s box.5
Occasionally (in 28% of all the episodes in our sample), the contestant also receives
the second offer to exchange her box. The “bank” typically offers the second exchange
opportunity when there are only two sealed boxes left (including the box in the pos-
session of the contestant).6 The second exchange offer is made at the discretion of the
“bank” (official rules of the show do not regulate when the “bank” should offer second
exchange possibility). However, in our recorded sample, the “bank” offers the second
exchange option almost equally frequently when the prize inside the contestant’s box
is above and below the median of the distribution of possible prizes. Thus, the second
exchange offer is uninformative, i.e., the contestants cannot infer new information
about the prize hidden inside their box upon observing the second exchange offer.
2.3 British version
Deal or No Deal UK is aired on Channel 4 of the British television. Twenty two
contestants from different parts of the UK participate in every episode.7 Prizes range
4 Before February 11, 2006, the first offer has always been made after the contestant opened six boxes.
Starting from February 11, 2006, the first offer is made after the contestant opened three boxes.
5 According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), the “bank” in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal is
informed about the prize sealed inside the contestant’s box and can potentially make informative offers.
6 Such offers constitute 71% of all the cases when the “bank” proposes the second exchange opportunity.
In 18% (7%) of the cases, the second exchange offer is made when five (eight) unopened boxes are left. In
one episode, exchange is offered when four unopened boxes are left.
7 Except for the British contestants, contestants from India, Italy, and the United States appeared on the
show. In contrast to the French and Italian version, in the British version, regional diversity is not strictly
observed, i.e., several representatives of the same administrative region may appear on the show at one time.
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Fig. 3 Screenshot with a list of possible prizes in the British version of Deal or No Deal
between £0.01 and £250,000 (Fig. 3). 8 They are randomly assigned to 22 boxes by an
independent adjudicator. However, an independent adjudicator does not assign boxes
to contestants. After the prizes are distributed across boxes and boxes are sealed,
contestants choose their boxes at random by drawing numbered ping-pong balls.
The British version of the show does not have a selection phase. The contestant is
pre-selected by the producers, and therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for
more than 30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game. However,
waiting contestants do not know in advance when they are going to be selected.
The game itself follows a similar procedure as in France and Italy: contestants
receive offers after opening 5, 3, 3, 3, 3, and 3 boxes, respectively. However, there are
three major differences. First, the contestants in Deal or No Deal UK rarely receive
exchange offers. As a rule, the “bank” offers to exchange the box when there are only
two unopened boxes left and the contestant rejects the last monetary offer.9
Second, in Deal or No Deal UK, the contestant may take advice from waiting
contestants or suggestions from the host about the next box to be opened or about
whether to accept or reject the deal from the “bank.” This is very different from the
procedure in France and Italy where it is observed by the representative of the inde-
pendent notary company, present on the show, that contestant’s decision to open a
certain box or to accept or reject the monetary offer of the “bank” is not precipitated
by the suggestions of waiting contestants or the host. Moreover, while in Deal or No
Deal UK the contestant is allowed to change her mind about opening a certain box
after she has already called out its number, in France and Italy contestants do not have
this opportunity.
8 At the time of the broadcasts, the exchange rate was £1 =e1.48.
9 Such offers constitute 78% of all the exchange offers in our Deal or No Deal UK dataset. In 21% of all
the cases, the first offer is the exchange offer. In one episode, exchange is offered when eight unopened
boxes are left.
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3 Data
The data set, analyzed in this article, consists of 49 television episodes of the French
version, 100 episodes of the Italian version, and 355 episodes of the British version
of Deal or No Deal. Only one contestant plays the game in every episode. French
episodes have been broadcasted from January 3, 2006 till April 10, 2006 on chan-
nel TF1.10 Italian episodes have been aired from September 20, 2005 to February 13,
2006 on channel RAI Uno.11 British episodes have been broadcasted from October 31,
2005 to January 12, 2007 on Channel 4 of the British television.12 Table 1 summarizes
selected descriptive statistics for French, Italian, and British contestants in our data set.
Deal or No Deal regulations state that prizes are allocated across boxes at random.
We have checked whether prizes are equally likely to appear inside each box. In our
data set, the distribution of prizes across boxes is not significantly different from a
uniform distribution at 1% significance level (e.g., Figs. 4 and 5 for Affari Tuoi). Thus,
there is no apparent reason for misconceptions that large prizes are more likely to be
inside particular boxes.
4 Theoretical prediction
Expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories such as, for
example, regret theory predict that an individual is exactly indifferent between keep-
ing her own box and exchanging it for any of the remaining identical sealed boxes.
However, (cumulative) prospect theory predicts that an individual should always reject
the exchange offer due to the assumption of loss aversion. First, we derive these the-
oretical predictions for a static decision problem when contestants evaluate a risky
lottery as a lottery that delivers each of the possible prizes (that have not yet been
eliminated from the game) with equal probability. Then, we consider a dynamic case,
when contestants evaluate a risky lottery taking into account the expectation of future
“bank” offers that they will receive in the course of the game.
4.1 Static decision problem
4.1.1 Expected utility theory
According to expected utility theory, an individual should be exactly indifferent
between keeping her box and exchanging it for any of the remaining sealed boxes.
10 French episodes have been recorded by Professor Anabela Botelho who generously shared the data with
us.
11 Italian episodes have been recorded by the authors.
12 A significant portion of the British data has been compiled from http://donduk.blogspot.com/2006/06/
previous-game-reports.html and related Internet sources. We have also watched several episodes, avail-
able online, including the Hall of Fame editions of the show with Deal or No Deal UK highlights. We
are particularly grateful to Dave Woollin for collecting show statistics and publishing it on http://www.
screwthebanker.com and to Morten Lau for providing information on the personal characteristics of the
contestants.
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Table 1 Selected descriptive statistics for French, Italian, and British contestants
Descriptive statistics French version Italian version British version
Percent of female 71% 55% 50%
Average age (years) 28 47 41
Percent of married 39% 81% 51%
Average earnings e71,579 e30,363 £16,763
Median earnings e50,000 e20,000 £12,900
Average number of exchange
offers per contestant
1.86 1.29 0.18
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Fig. 4 The distribution of prizes from 0.01 to 500 Euros across 20 boxes
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes
each containing one of the prizes x1 < x2 < · · · < xN . If an individual keeps
her box, she obtains expected utility 1N
∑N
i=1 u (w + xi ), where u (·) is a von
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Fig. 5 The distribution of prizes from 5,000 to 500,000 Euros across 20 boxes
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the contestant and w is her private
wealth.
If the contestant exchanges her box that contains prize xi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, for one of
the remaining sealed boxes, she obtains expected utility 1N−1
∑N
j=1 u
j =i
(
w + x j
)
. The
contestant does not know the content of her box and any prize x1, . . . , xN is equally
likely to be inside her box. Therefore, after exchanging the boxes, the contestant
receives expected utility 1N
∑N
i=1 1N−1
∑N
j=1 u
j =i
(
w + x j
) = 1N (N−1)
∑N
i=1
(∑N
j=1
u
(
w + x j
) − u (w + xi )
) = 1N
∑N
i=1 u (w + xi ). Thus, the contestant receives
exactly the same expected utility after exchanging her box as after keeping her initial
box. In other words, according to expected utility theory, there is no reason why the
contestant should accept or reject an offer to exchange her box for one of the remaining
sealed boxes.
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4.1.2 Regret theory
Many generalized non-expected utility theories also predict that an individual is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting swap offer. For example, according to the
regret theory, an individual always accepts exchange offer if 1N (N−1)
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 ψ
j =i(
xi , x j
)
> 0, where ψ (·, ·) is a skew-symmetric utility function, i.e., ψ (xi , x j
) =
−ψ (x j , xi
) (e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1987). It is easy to see that ∑Ni=1
∑N
j=1 ψ
j =i
(
xi , x j
)=∑Ni=2
∑i−1
j=1 ψ
(
xi , x j
)+∑N−1i=1
∑N
j=i+1ψ
(
xi , x j
)=∑Ni=2
∑i−1
j=1ψ
(
xi , x j
)
−∑Nj=i+1
∑N−1
i=1 ψ
(
x j , xi
) = 0. Thus, according to the regret theory, a contestant is
exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the exchange offer. The intuition
behind this result is simple. A contestant who accepts the exchange offer experiences
ex post regret when she discovers at the end of the show that her initial box contained a
larger prize. However, a contestant who rejects the exchange offer experiences exactly
the same ex post regret when she opens all the boxes only to discover that her initial
box contains a smaller prize than one of the boxes that she could have selected when
the bank offered an exchange.
4.1.3 (Cumulative) prospect theory
In prospect theory, an individual derives utility from changes in her asset position
relative to a reference point (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Prospect theory does
not specify what constitutes a reference point in a particular decision problem. In
this section, we show that an individual should never exchange her own box for any
of the remaining sealed boxes irrespective of the location of a reference point. This
theoretical prediction is driven by the assumption of loss aversion.
A contestant who rejects the exchange offer and keeps her box derives zero util-
ity, since her asset position does not change (relative to any reference point). Now
consider a contestant who accepts the exchange offer. Let w be her private wealth
(excluding the content of her box) and let xi , i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, denote a prize inside
her box before exchange. Let v (.) be the value function that measures utility from
changes in wealth relative to a reference point. The value function is normalized so
that v (0) = 0. Prospect theory assumes that individuals are loss averse, so that the
value function is steeper for losses than for gains, i.e., v (x) < −v (−x) for any x > 0
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Although prospect theory does not specify the location of a reference point, it
assumes that individuals incorporate their initial endowments into their reference point
(e.g., Kahneman et al. 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1991).13 Thus, in the context of
13 Notice that if a contestant swaps boxes due to her subjective belief that her initial box contains a low
prize, she may be expected to open an old box immediately after exchange. Interestingly, 90% of the con-
testants who accepted the exchange offer in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal, do not open their old
box immediately after exchange. Contestants who accepted the first exchange offer opened on average 5.6
boxes before they called their old box to be opened. This may suggest that Italian contestants developed a
sense of ownership and incorporated the content of their initial endowment into their reference point.
123
Endowment effects? 183
this natural experiment, we can write a reference point as r + xi , where r is constant.
Notice that r = w is a special case corresponding to the original version of the pros-
pect theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where a reference point is assumed to
be equal to a current asset position. A recently proposed model of Koszegi and Rabin
(2006) corresponds to a special case when constant r equals to the private wealth of
a contestant w plus her (unobservable) rational expectation of future earnings in Deal
or No Deal. In the remainder of the article, we will assume that r ≥ w.
According to the cumulative prospect theory, a contestant who exchanges her own
box with prize xi for a box with a lower prize x j , j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} obtains utility∑i−1
j=1 v(w + x j − r − xi ) · [w−(Pr(δ ≤ w + x j − r − xi )) − w−(Pr(δ < w + x j −
r − xi ))], where w− : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the probability weighting function for losses
(Tversky and Kahneman 1991) and Pr(δ < w + x j − r − xi ) denotes the probability
that the change in wealth δ during the swap of boxes (relative to a reference point
r + xi ) is lower than w + x j − r − xi .
Finally, according to the cumulative prospect theory, a contestant who exchanges
her own box with prize xi for a box with a higher prize x j , j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , N } obtains
utility
∑N
j=i+1 v(w + x j − r − xi )·[w+(Pr(δ ≥ w+ x j −r − xi ))−w+(Pr(δ > w+
x j − r − xi ))], where w+ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the probability weighting function
for gains. The contestant does not know the prize xi sealed inside her box, but she
knows that each prize x1, . . . , xN is likely to be inside her box. Effectively, she has a
stochastic reference point, and her ex ante utility from exchanging the boxes is given
by
U =
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
v
(
w + x j − r − xi
) · [w−
(
Pr
(
δ ≤ w + x j − r − xi
))
−w−
(
Pr
(
δ < w + x j − r − xi
))] +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
v
(
w + x j − r − xi
)
· [w+
(
Pr
(
δ ≥ w + x j − r − xi
)) −w+
(
Pr
(
δ > w + x j − r − xi
))]
or, equivalently, by
U =
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
{
v
(
x j − xi + w − r
) · [w−
(
Pr
(
δ ≤ x j − xi + w − r
))
−w−
(
Pr
(
δ < x j − xi + w − r
))] + v (xi − x j + r − w
)
· [w+
(
Pr
(
δ ≥ xi − x j + r − w
) −w+
(
Pr
(
δ > xi − x j + r − w
))]} (1)
Since all the prizes are randomly distributed across the boxes, when two boxes are
exchanged, every positive change in wealth is equally likely as a negative change in
wealth of the same absolute amount (relative to the same reference point). In other
words, Pr
(
δ ≥ xi − x j + r − w
) = Pr (δ ≤ x j − xi + w − r
)
and Pr
(
δ > xi − x j+
r − w) = Pr (δ < x j − xi + w − r
)
for every xi > x j and r ≥ w. The assumption of
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loss aversion additionally implies that v
(
xi − x j + r − w
)
< −v (x j − xi + w − r
)
for every xi > x j and r ≥ w. Using these two results, we can rewrite Eq. 1 as an
inequality
U <
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
v
(
x j − xi + w − r
) · [w−
(
Pr
(
δ ≤ x j − xi + w − r
))
−w−
(
Pr
(
δ < x j − xi + w − r
)) − w+
(
Pr
(
δ ≤ x j − xi + w − r
))
+w+
(
Pr
(
δ < x j − xi + w − r
))] (2)
Previous experimental studies demonstrate that the probability weighting func-
tion typically has a similar shape for gains and losses, but it is more curved for
gains and more linear for losses (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Abdellaoui
2000). We will assume that there exists probability q ≤ 1/2 such that w+ (p + ε) −
w+ (p) ≥ w− (p + ε)−w− (p) for any p, p+ε ∈ [0, q] and w+ (p + ε)−w+ (p) ≤
w− (p + ε)−w− (p) for any p, p+ε ∈ [q, 1]. Inequality (2) then immediately implies
that U < 0, i.e., the contestant derives a strictly negative utility from exchanging her
box for one of the remaining sealed boxes. In other words, according to the pros-
pect theory, an individual has a strong reason not to exchange her box: the value of
exchange is strictly negative because a loss averse individual expects more aggravation
from losses than the pleasure from gains of the same amount.
4.2 Dynamic decision problem
In a dynamic decision problem, contestants take into account future “bank” offers that
they are likely to receive in course of the game. A contestant facing prizes x1 and x2
hidden in two unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery L (x1, 1/2; x2, 1/2)
just as in a static decision problem.14 The contestant facing prizes x = {x1, . . . , xN }
hidden in N > 2 unopened boxes perceives them as a risky lottery L (x). Let m
denote the number of boxes that the contestant has to open before the next “bank”
offer is made (m is either 2 or 3 in the French version, m is either 1 or 3 in the
Italian version, and m = 3 in the British version of Deal or No Deal). There are
C NN−m = N !/(m! (N − m)!) combinations of prizes x that the contestant can face
when the next offer is made. Let us denote these combinations by x1, . . . , xCNN−m .
Lottery L (x) is then recursively defined by
L (x) = 1 − πˆN−m
C NN−m
C NN−m∑
i=1
[
L (xi ) I
(
u (L (xi )) ≥ u
(
Oˆ (xi )
))
+ Oˆ (xi ) I
(
u (L (xi )) < u
(
Oˆ (xi )
))]
+ πˆN−m
C NN−m
C NN−m∑
i=1
L (xi ), (3)
14 In French, Italian, and British versions of Deal or No Deal, the “bank” does not make any further
monetary offers when a monetary offer for two prizes is rejected. Thus, in this case, dynamic and static
decision problems coincide because there are no anticipated “bank” offers in the future.
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where Oˆ (xi ) is the expectation of a future monetary offer for xi prizes left in the
unopened boxes, πˆN−m is the expected probability that the “bank” offers an exchange
option instead of a monetary amount at the stage when N −m boxes remain unopened
and I (x) is an indicator function, i.e., I (x) = 1 if x is true and I (x) = 0 if x is false.15
For the sake of our argument, an anticipated future offer Oˆ (xi ) can be either a proba-
bility distribution over possible monetary amounts or a monetary amount for certain.
4.2.1 Expected utility theory
Consider a contestant who is offered an exchange when there are N sealed boxes
with remaining prizes x = {x1, . . . , xN }. If N = 2, this contestant obtains expected
utility u (L (x)) = u (w + x1)/2 + u (w + x2)/2 from rejecting the exchange offer.
If N > 2, utility from rejecting the swap offer can be calculated through a Bellman
optimality equation
u (L (x)) = 1
C NN−m
C NN−m∑
i=1
[(
1 − πˆN−m
)
max
{
u (L (xi )), u
(
Oˆ (xi )
)}
+ πˆN−mu (L (xi ))
]
. (4)
Now consider the case when the contestant exchanges her old box for the new box
with prize x j , j ∈ {1, . . . , N } sealed inside. If N = 2, this contestant obtains expected
utility u (L (x)) = u (w + x1)/2 + u (w + x2)/2 after accepting the exchange offer.
If N > 2, there are C N−1N−1−m = (N − 1)!/(m! (N − 1 − m)!) = C NN−m/N combi-
nations of prizes x, all of which include prize x j , that the contestant can face when
the next offer is made. Let us denote these combinations by x1|x j , . . . , xCNN−m/N
∣
∣
∣
x j
.
Utility from accepting the exchange offer (conditional on the prize x j being inside the
new box) is then given by Bellman equation
u
(
L
(
x|x j
))
= N
C NN−m
C NN−m/N∑
i=1
[(
1 − πˆN−m
)
max
{
u
(
L
(
xi |x j
))
, u
(
Oˆ
(
xi |x j
))}
+πˆN−mu
(
L
(
xi |x j
))]
(5)
Since the contestant does not know which prize is sealed inside her new box and
prizes are distributed across boxes at random, expected utility after accepting exchange
is given by 1N
∑N
j=1 u
(
L
(
x|x j
))
, where conditional expected utilityu
(
L
(
x|x j
))
15 For any two lotteries, L1 (y1, p1; . . . ; yk , pk ) and L2 (z1, q1; . . . ; zl , ql ) a compound lottery αL1 +
(1 − α) L2, α ∈ [0, 1], is defined in the usual way—it yields outcome yi with probability α · pi , i ∈
{1, . . . , k}, and outcome z j with probability (1 − α) · q j , j ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
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is defined in (5). Notice that ⋃Nj=1
{
x1|x j , . . . , xCNN−m/N
∣
∣
∣
x j
}
=
{
x1, . . . , xCNN−m
}
and expected utility after accepting exchange offer can be re-written as (4). Thus, in
a dynamic decision problem, expected utility maximizer gets the same utility from
accepting and from rejecting exchange offer.
4.2.2 (Cumulative) prospect theory
In a dynamic decision problem, similar to a static decision problem, contestants obtain
zero utility from rejecting the exchange offer because their asset position does not
change relative to any reference point that they may adopt. Next, we show that contes-
tants receive a strictly negative utility from accepting the exchange offer. If there
are only two unopened boxes left with prizes x1 and x2 sealed inside, a contes-
tant, who accepts the exchange offer, derives utility v (w + x1 − r − x2) w− (1/2) +
v (w + x2 − r − x1) w+ (1/2)<− v (r + x2 − w − x1) w− (1/2) + v (w + x2−
r − x1) w+ (1/2) ≤ v (r + x2 − w − x1)
[
w+ (1/2) − w− (1/2)
] ≤ 0, with the first
(strict) inequality due to the assumption of loss aversion.
If there are N > 2 unopened boxes left, a contestant faces a lottery recursively
defined by (3). Notice that we cannot write Bellman Eq. 4 because (cumulative) pros-
pect theory does not satisfy the independence axiom of expected utility theory. Let
L (z1, p1; . . . ; zM , qM ) denote the reduced form of a compound lottery, which is
recursively defined in (3). According to (cumulative) prospect theory, utility of this
lottery is given by
U =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
z j <xi
v
(
w + z j − r − xi
) · [w−
(
Pr
(
δ ≤ w + z j − r − xi
))
−w−
(
Pr
(
δ < w + z j − r − xi
))] +
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
z j >xi
v
(
w + z j − r − xi
)
· [w+
(
Pr
(
δ ≥ w + z j − r − xi
)) −w+
(
Pr
(
δ > w + z j − r − xi
))]
.
If prizes are distributed across boxes at random and contestants’ expectation of
future monetary offers depends only on the set of possible prizes,16 every positive
change in wealth during the swap is equally likely as a negative change in wealth of
the same absolute amount (relative to the same reference point). Following the deri-
vation presented in Sect. 4.1.3, we can easily show that U < 0 due to the assumption
of loss aversion.
16 Deck et al. (2008); Post et al. (2008), and Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2008, 2009) all report that “bank”
monetary offers depend only on the distribution of possible prizes (in particular, the expected value of
possible prizes). Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) also find strong correlation between the expected value of
possible prizes and “bank” monetary offers.
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Table 2 Decisions of contestants on the first (or only) exchange offer
Decision on the first (or the only) exchange offer Number (percentage) of episodes
French version Italian version British version
Accept 19 (46%) 40 (40%) 27 (43%)
Reject 22 (54%) 60 (60%) 36 (57%)
Table 3 Decisions of contestants on the second exchange offer
Decision on the first
exchange offer
Decision on the second
exchange offer
Number (percentage) of episodes
French version Italian version
Accept Accept 1(4%) 3(11%)
Reject 12(44%) 8(28%)
Reject Accept 11(41%) 7(25%)
Reject 3(11%) 10(36%)
5 Results
Tables 2 and 3 show the decisions of contestants on the first (or the only) exchange
offer and the second exchange offer, respectively. The second swap opportunity is
offered only in French and Italian versions of Deal or No Deal. It is accepted in 45%
of the cases in the French version and in 36% of the cases in the Italian version.
Observed decisions are quite similar across all the three versions even through French
contestants typically receive several swap offers, Italian contestants are guaranteed to
get at least one exchange opportunity and only one fifth of the British contestants are
given the chance to swap boxes.
High percentage of contestants, who accept the exchange offer and do not keep
their initial endowment, shows that contestants exhibit rather weak endowment effects.
Contestants who accept at least one exchange offer do not reveal endowment effects.
Contestants who rejected all the swap offers do not necessarily exhibit an endowment
effect. Thus, contestants who accept the first (or the only) exchange offer, and contes-
tants who reject the first offer but accept the second offer are not averse to losses. 73%
of French contestants, 47% of Italian contestants, and 43% of British contestants who
have receive the exchange offer in our dataset, clearly reveal no endowment effect.17
Expected utility theory and many non-expected utility theories (e.g., regret theory)
predict that an individual is exactly indifferent between accepting and rejecting the
swap. The chi-squared statistics for the null hypothesis that contestants accept the
exchange offer with probability 50% are χ2 = 0.286 (p = 0.593), χ2 = 2.722 (p =
0.099), and χ2 = 1.286 (p = 0.257), respectively, for French, Italian, and British
contestants, who received only one exchange offer. Thus, these contestants appear to
17 In the French (Italian) version of Deal or No Deal, 19 (40) contestants accept the first offer and 11 (7)
contestants reject the first offer, but accept the second offer. Thus, 30 out of 41 French contestants (73%)
and 47 out of 100 Italian contestants (47%), who receive the swap offer, accept at least one exchange offer.
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Table 4 Decisions of French contestants on the third exchange offer
First exchange Accept Reject
Second exchange Accept Reject Accept Reject
Third exchange Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject Accept Reject
Number (%) of episodes 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 3 (16%) 4 (21%) 2 (10.5%) 8 (42%) 0 (0%) 2 (10.5%)
be largely indifferent between accepting and rejecting the swap. However, in all the
three versions, a higher proportion of contestants reject the swap offer. This is consis-
tent with certain degree of “stickiness” that Friedman (1998) finds in the Monty Hall
problem and with the “reluctance to switch” that Charness and Levin (2005) observe
in a simple Bayesian updating game.
For contestants who received two exchange offers, the chi-squared statistics are
χ2 = 13.741 (p = 0.003) and χ2 = 3.714 (p = 0.294), respectively, in the French
and Italian versions. Thus, the hypothesis that these contestants are equally likely to
accept or reject the swap cannot be rejected in the Italian dataset, but it is rejected at
1% significance level in the French dataset. To shed more light on this finding, con-
sider the decisions of 19 French contestants who have received three exchange offers
(Table 4). The frequency of these decisions is significantly different from a uniform
distribution (χ2 = 21.842, p = 0.003).
An inspection of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that Deal or No Deal contestants tend to
accept one exchange offer, but they are reluctant to swap boxes several times even if
the exchange opportunity is persistently repeated.18 Thus, multiple exchange oppor-
tunities increase the number of contestants who swap boxes once (in violation of
the endowment effect). However, multiple exchange opportunities cause no sizable
increase in the number of contestants who swap boxes more than once (in violation of
the assumption that contestants are equally likely to accept and to reject the exchange
offer).
Approximately every second contestant who receives the exchange offer swaps the
boxes at least once. Thus, observed endowment effects are weaker in our recorded
sample compared with typical findings in the laboratory experiments. However, if
preferences or decision-making rules are heterogeneous, our results may suggest that
while most contestants are indifferent to accepting the exchange offer, some of them
exhibit endowment effects. Another possibility could be that people are generally
loss averse when boxes contain large prizes, but they are largely indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the swap if large prizes are eliminated from the game. In
order to investigate these hypotheses, we regress exchange decisions on lottery-spe-
cific (expected value, median, and standard deviation of possible prizes, etc.) and
individual-specific variables (gender, age, and marital status). Maximum likelihood
logit coefficient estimates (and standard errors) are reported in Table 5.
18 Our sample also includes four French contestants who received four exchange offers during the game.
Among these contestants, one contestant rejected all the four offers, two contestants accepted one exchange
offer, and the remaining contestants swapped boxes twice.
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Table 5 Estimated coefficients (standard errors) in a logit regression of exchange decisions (dependant
variable is 1 if contestant swaps boxes and 0 otherwise)
Explanatory
variables
French version Italian version British version
Constant 5.7326 (4.4159) 0.3027 (2.1527) 4.2688(2.6896)
Natural logarithm of expected
value of possible prizes
−0.7766 (1.2433) 0.1300 (1.0588) 0.7133(1.4368)
Natural logarithm of a
median possible prize
−0.0635 (0.1845) 0.0827 (0.1636) 0.3959(0.6906)
Natural logarithm of a
standard deviation of
possible prizes
0.4124 (1.1894) 0.0078 (0.9682) −1.2981(0.9610)
Number of “large” prizes left
in the list of possible prizesa
−0.1145 (0.1294) −0.0919 (0.1421) 0.2114(0.3353)
Gender dummy (0 for male, 1
for female)
−0.2466 (0.5656) −0.7332 (0.3937) −0.7499(0.6000)
Self-reported age or an
estimate based on a physical
appearance (in years)
−0.0048 (0.0516) −0.0297 (0.0169) −0.0255(0.0247)
Marital status (1 for married,
2 for single, 3 for divorced,
4 for widowed)
−0.2628 (0.4820) −0.4354 (0.3286) −1.1338(0.9728)
Dummy variable (=1 if a
contestant already accepted
an earlier swap offer)
−1.6023 (0.6282) −0.5723 (0.8508) –
Number of observations N 91 129 63
Log-likelihood −55.0224 −81.5361 −37.4887
McFadden’s likelihood ratio
index
0.1277 0.0881 0.1415
Veall and Zimmermann R2 0.2589 0.1874 0.2823
a
“Large” prizes are defined as prizes that appear on the right-hand side of a television screen. “Large” prizes
are prizes greater thane5000 in French version, greater thane500 in Italian version, and greater than £750
in British version
Table 5 shows that exchange decisions do not depend on the distribution of
possible monetary prizes that contestants face when the “bank” offers a swap opportu-
nity. Contestants, who eliminated large prizes, do not appear to be significantly more
likely to accept or reject the exchange offer compared to contestants who eliminated
small prizes. Similarly, contestants’ decision to accept the exchange offer is apparently
not affected by the expected value, median, or standard deviation of prizes that are left
in unopened boxes.
Table 5 also shows no evidence of exchange decisions being correlated with
individual-specific variables (only in the Italian version of Deal or No Deal female,
and older contestants are marginally less likely to accept a swap offer). Overall, none
of lottery-specific or individual-specific variables has a significant explanatory power
for predicting the decisions to accept the exchange offer.19 Such decisions appear to be
19 The only variable that is statistically significant (in the French version of Deal or No Deal) is a dummy
variable indicating whether a contestant already accepted a swap offer earlier in the course of the show.
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quite random and spontaneous, perhaps indicating that contestants are indeed largely
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the swap offer.
6 Conclusion
Television show Deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity to study individual deci-
sion making under risk using lotteries with outcomes as high as half a million euros.
Perhaps for the first time since the famous thought experiment of Maurice Allais,
we can investigate choice between large-stake lotteries with real incentives and real
people. Contestants from various regions of France, Italy, and United Kingdom are
widely dispersed in terms of age and occupation, which makes them a more diversified
subject pool compared to the undergraduate students in the conventional laboratory
experiments.
Deal or No Deal contestants are endowed with a sealed box containing unknown
monetary prize (drawn from a known uniform distribution). In French, Italian, and
British versions of Deal or No Deal, contestants can exchange their initial endowment
for an identical box with another prize drawn from the same uniform distribution. We
find that 73% of French contestants, 47% of Italian contestants, and 43% of British
contestants, who receive the possibility to swap their box, accept the exchange offer
at least once. Thus, Deal or No Deal contestants reveal weaker endowment effects
compared with typical findings in the laboratory experiments. These results suggest
that even inexperienced individuals may overcome endowment effect when facing
unusual decision problem involving substantial monetary rewards.
Exchange decisions are not correlated with lottery-specific variables such as the
expected value of possible prizes. Contestants, who eliminated large prizes from
the list of possible prizes, do not appear to be more likely to accept or reject the
exchange offer. We also find that exchange decisions are not correlated with individual-
specific variables, with the exception of Italian female and older contestants, who are
marginally less likely to accept the exchange offer. Thus, if there are individual differ-
ences in the strength of endowment effects, they appear to be largely an unobserved
heterogeneity.
In traditional laboratory studies of endowment effects (e.g., Plott and Zeiler 2007;
List 2004; Knetsch 1989) subjects are endowed with physical goods of a similar value.
In contrast, Deal or No Deal contestants receive uncertain endowments. The use of
risky lotteries as the objects of exchange is a promising avenue for studying endow-
ment effects when stakes are as high as half a million Euros. Commodities that have
similar high value (e.g., real estate properties, Monet paintings from the same series,
etc.) are never exactly identical with many small inconsequential differences (e.g., a
view from the window).
An experimenter can hardly control for such differences that may be just sufficient
for inducing a strict preference for one of the objects. However, an experimenter can
always construct identical risky lotteries over cash prizes or physical goods. Labora-
tory studies show that the effects of loss aversion are just as strong in choice under risk
as they are in a riskless choice (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Thus, the research
on the loss aversion and the endowment effect can benefit from further laboratory
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experiments on the exchange asymmetries when the objects of exchange are identical
risky lotteries.
If contestants incorporate the (initially unknown) content of the box that they select
for themselves at the beginning of the show into their reference point, then loss aver-
sion predicts that contestants should always reject a swap offer. This is a stronger
implication of loss aversion than that in the mug-candy bar exchange experiments
(Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988; Knetsch 1989). In these
experiments, loss aversion implies that the fraction of individuals, who are not willing
to exchange a mug (candy bar) for a candy bar (mug), should be higher in the treat-
ment where subjects were initially endowed with a mug (candy bar) compared to the
fraction of subjects in the baseline treatment, who were endowed with nothing and
subsequently choose a mug (candy bar). Such control treatment is not required in our
natural experiment because two objects that are exchanged yield identical distributions
of monetary prizes.
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